" Swiss police have recently tracked
the whereabouts of mobile phone users from the computer of the service
provider Swisscom, which according
Sonntagszeitung had stored movements of more
than a million subscribers down to a few hundred meters, and going back
at least half a year."
http://www.europarl.eu.int/dg4/stoa/en/publi/166499/execsum.htm
Recommandation
(95) 4
http://www.coe.fr/dataprotection
Comments:
All the time violated. E.g. France telecom got one authorization
and placed it in an access node (trunk in central, B-ISDN line
in central, main server TCP/IP in France Telecom,...) and so taps
simultaneously 10,000 lines. (Source: CNIL, Mr. Drouard.)
2.2
Impossible and never applied.
Slot time GSM test is indirect tapping. Idem for gonio,
real time tapping. Anonymity in telecom system is impossible.
E.g. Swiss Natel Easy (anonymous GSM), except the first time,
leads sooner or later to the automatic tapping system:
Cd-Cg P, CLIP, Forcer Identication, internal billing system,
PLU/back-up, words/voice recognition system, public phones automatic
tapping system (airport, center of great town,...).
2.2
A wish, never applied.
(Strasbourg 81, STE, no 108, art. 8 CEDH,...) is impossible to be
applied. There are actually too many automatic tapping system:
word(s) recognition, CLIP calling identification line system,
Called-calling Parties (Cd-Cg P), billing systems, trap, others
automatic identification system, public phones tapping,...
7.2
All billing information is kept 6 months-10 years.
No effective control on back-ups (and back-ups of back-ups).
7.4
A wish. Actually EDVT electronic directory in public phones are tapped
by Swisscom. It's the same with others public electronic directory
(Minitel, France Telecom telematic web directory,...)
7.10
7.11
For me, commercial profile is public life.
7.16
7.17
Impossible, if customer can cancel (e.g. *31 or ask for operator)
the identication of their number; police, urgence, telecom...
have all time the number: FORCER IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM, NORA,...
7.19
Called-Calling Parties, CLIP,...: filters are impossible.
The last step (judge,...): yes
7.20
In France and Belgium, each crypto system must be (quickly) breakable.
In others countries, crypto's freely available but also must be (slowly)
breakable, http://www.crypto.ch. The length of crypto key means nothing
(under 2100 bits). The illusion of protection helps generate profitable
interceptions.
7.21
Wrong and impossible.
Each GSM generates a cell trace. Each back-up & PLU is actually
freely accessiblefree for each GSM operator. CNIL suggests a European
harmonization for it. For each GSM call, the originating cell is
recording with a back-up and followed by cell/PLU trace/GSM in stand-by)
all the time and for each GSM. It's a real and massive problem.
Phil Karn [Qualcomm Scientist/Cryptographer]:
"Cellular registration is one of the most problematical privacy
issues in modern telecommunications."
In conclusion, this recommendation is contradicted by Enfopol
( illegal projective but effective step by step) ETSI tracing equipment
recommendations
and the actual practice of interception.
The European Council :
The CEDH
declares that article 8 of the Convention on Human Rights has not been
violated. This right is contradictory
(CEDH,
KLASS case, 6.9.78, nb 28).
This commission
is obviously in favour of state phone-tapping in 99% cases.
Example
: Beliaev (Quesmy Castle -60 640 Quesmy) who lives in many different places
(France, the Netherlands, Moscow, Irland)
is not
only a Russian interpreter with European parliamentary privilege and protected
by the discretion of the European Council
(not mentionned
in the official list) without his boss knowing it, is actually a specialist
in off-shore investment (Delaware State, Irland)
via the
FINEC and the creation of European V.A.T numbers in these areas.
He also
recycles money in Zürich and Geneva illegally (without a visa) by
using the magic sentence "I work for the European Council"
and bypasses
law. In association with his clients,he buys millions Swiss francs, before
the EURO currency is set up, and then sells the
money
at the right time, to triple his benefits (no tax).
The principle
of proportionality (high and average murder rate), and serious offences
is not respected by the
European
Commission.
ANNEX
| TO BE CHECKED | TO BE CHECKED | TO BE CHECKED | |||
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| Definition ou authorities entitled to order phone-taping | examining judge | examining judge; presdt of the court of criminal appeal, etc... | public prosecutor’s office | court (emergency) | court (emergency) |
| Définition of persons likely to have their phones tapped | None | None : automatic tapping of public phone boxes | Suspect or third parties in touch with the suspect | Suspect or third parties in touch with the suspect | The suspect |
| Offences giving rise to phone-tapping | Crimes and offences in the incurred sentence is superior to 2 years | Offences
(serious or not)
Information K |
Closed list of offences (related to terrorism) | Crimes and offences when the incurred sentence is superior to 1 year | Closed list of offences and offences with 5 years sentence |
| Duration of the phone-tapping operation | 4 months, renewable | 1 month (canton) or 6 months, renewable | 3 month, renewable | Not mentionned | 2 weeks, renewable |
| Conditions of retranscription with a minute of the recorded calls | Transcription by the judge or under his control and an officer from the Criminal Investigation Dept. | None | None | None | Entire retranscription |
| Protection of the entire recording | The recordings are sealed | Not for TAB - Recordings are sealed, but there are losses and theft | None | None | None |
| Control by the judge and Defense | Procedure pieces after due hearting of the parties | None | None | None | None |
| Erasing of recorded tapes especially when the case was dismissed for lack of evidence | The recordings are destroyed at the public prosecutor’s request when the time of prescription of the public action expires | The recordings which are irrelevant to the revelation of the thruth are kept separately and destroyed when the procedure is over, but not TABS | The recordings which are irrelevant to the procedure are destroyed | None | None |
ANNEX
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|
|
Yes : "interception of Communication Act, | -
Minister;
- In case of emergency, the highest ranking public officials - or under-secretary |
-
"Court" (made up of 3 lawyers)
- "Commissionner" |
-
2 months
- Renewal - 6 months maximum (breach of national Security) - 1 month (prevention of criminality) |
-
Security of the country
- Prevent or discover a serious crime - saveguard the économical prosperity of the UK |
Yes, but only when the law has been violated; information given by the court. | -
by the court : nullification of the mandate which authories phone-tapping
- interests are paéid to the subscriber who was the victim of an illégal interception |
- Any System of public telecommunication | Yes
Yearly; the first part is made public |
|
|
Yes
"G10" Act. : act referring to art. 10 of the constitution of the 13th August 1968, altered on the 10th July 1989, and then on the 27th May 1992 |
-
Supreme Authorities of the land
- The minister is appointed by the Federal Chancellor (Minister of Defense) |
-
1 commettee (made up of 5 members of parliament elected by the Bundestag
(opposition parties are represented) (information given twice a year)
- 1 commission (made up of 3 members) no members of parliament, who are appointed by the Committee. It gives a verdict on the legality and necessity of the measure (information given each month, before the measure is carried out - The commission should have given its consent, except in case of emergency |
-
3 months renewable
- renewel every 3 month in some cases. |
-
Defend the fundemental democratic and liberal order.
- Protect the existence or the security of the Fédération or of a land. - Ensure the national Security, the defence of the public order and the prevention of serious offences. - Prevent offences against the internal security of the state. - Prevent offences against national defence. - Prevent threatens against the security of the NATO troups. |
Yes | -
in case the measures are illegaly judged bt the commission, the Minister
should immediatly delay the measure
- once the notification was decided, the person concerned can lodge a request at the court |
Telecommunications | No
Meetings and deliberations of the committee and the Secret commission |
|
|
Yes
- the 24th June 1915 Act - the 17th December 1973 related to the telephonic surveillance during the investigation of the violations of the legislation on narcotics (texts also related to judicial phone - tapping within an investigation case |
-
Court (law related to violations of the legislation on narcotics
- in emergency cases : the prosecution (for a period of 24 hours) - 1 person appointed by the king (only if it is useful for the security of the kingdom or if the military secrecy was broken |
-
Court
- 1 committee made up of 3 members appointed by the king |
-
Prevention of violations against the legislation on narcoties
- violation of military secrecy - violation of the security of the kingdom |
No | Cessation of the measure | All telecommunications | -
by the police : report given every 3 month and every year to the public
prosecutor, transmitted to the committee and the ministry of justice
- yearly report by the committee to the minister of Justice |
|
|
|
Yes
:
- article ss al. 1 and 2 of the constitution -organic Act of the 1st December 1980, called "Antiterrorist Act" |
-competent
judge
- in emergency cases, the Minister of the Interior or the director of the Security of State (information given by the judge within 752 hours) |
-competent
judge
- information every 3 month, by the Congress, deputies ans Senate |
- 3 months; renewable every 3 month | -
terrorism
- breach of the external security of the state - possession, depot, manufacture, transport of arms. - offence against life and physical integrity - fires - illégal detention |
No | -
Compensations
- nullification of the measure - penal responsability of the culprits - civil responsability of the State |
Telegraphic and telephonic communications | Report by the government every 3 month to the Parliament |
|
|
Yes
No concerned : lawyers, priests, relationship man-woman |
A
court : FISA
(Foreign intelligence Security act court) |
FISA | - 90 days renewable | -
spying
- terrorism - complete report |
No | Nullification
of the measure
Penal sanction against the FBI agents who have contreveened the law |
All telecommunications | ? |
|
|
Yes
:
article 88-3 of the criminal investigation code |
The president of the government with the approval of a commission, made up of a president of the Superior Court of Justice | The Commission | - 3 months, renewable every 3 month | Search
for breaches of the external
Security of the State |
No | Nullification of the measure | All telecommunications | Not forecast by law |